If the relationship breaks down, she may find herself trapped in the marriage for fear of the consequences of divorce – and trapped if she leaves, because of the constraints of the prenup. She is at the mercy of her spouse. Such a scenario is not uncommon in other countries but in England and Wales, despite the ruling in Radmacher v Granatino last year, we still do things differently.

In my experience – and I accept, of course, that I am instructed when things go wrong – the existence of a prenup can cause resentment to build and anger to surface. Eventually, the couple’s relationship can wither on the vine. I’ve seen it happen, and I have also been contacted by readers of this blog who have been caught up in these types of agreement and don’t know what to do.

It can be argued that that you enter into a prenuptial agreement freely and of your own will. You are not forced to sign, and you know what you are doing. So why should you not be held to your bargain? It happens in Europe and it happens in the USA. The Supreme Court certainly thought so in Radmacher v Granatino. That case featured a prenuptial agreement signed in Germany and which, to many English lawyers, seemed grotesquely unfair. But the poorer spouse, in this case the husband, was held to his bargain. He had signed it and he had to live with the consequences, leaving his marriage with nothing from his heiress wife. He had signed away his entitlement to capital or income.

Or had he?

Radmacher v Granatino

When the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in the case, it left a window open:

The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement.

Although the judgment gave prenuptial agreements “decisive weight”, it is still not necessarily the case that prenups are upheld by English law. To fill the gaps and avoid any further possibility of “fairness” raising its irrelevant head, new legislation may be on the way next year.

In the meantime, how much wriggle room is there in reality?

There were critics of the Radmacher decision who wondered if a similar fate would have befallen a woman in front of the Supreme Court. Had the roles been reversed, and Mr Granatino had been the one worth £100 million, would Ms. Radmacher have left the marriage with nothing? Or would the court have found a way of meeting the needs of a wife and mother? Perhaps the effect of Radmacher v Granatino could only truly be understood when such a case came before the courts…

This then was the speculation swirling around the newly appointed Mr Justice Moor in one of his first cases, Z v Z [2011] EWHC 2878.

Z v Z

In this case, it fell to Mr Justice Moor to adjudicate the merits of a French prenuptial agreement – a Separation des Biens – between two French citizens living in London. In that agreement, the wife had surrendered any right to share in the couple’s shared assets. Only the assets in their own names would ever remain their own. However there was no mention of maintenance in the agreement.

Acting for the wife, Tim Scott QC won the first round before Mr Justice Ryder, securing English jurisdiction. It then took three years before the wife’s application for a financial settlement was finally heard, before Mr Justice Moor in October 2011. The judge had to decide whether to give full intent and effect to the draconian French agreement signed by the wife in France in 1994, days before the couple’s marriage.

The couple had gone on to have three children. The assets involved were £15 million, of which the wife had £1.3 million in her name. The husband was an extremely high earner: between 2006 and 2011, his average annual income was in the region of €3 million. His income was thereafter projected to drop, to exclude bonuses.

The husband’s position was that sharing, per White v White, was excluded as a consequence of the 1994 agreement. He accepted the narrow window afforded by that particular agreement – that the wife’s needs should be met – and, assessing and capitalising her housing and maintenance needs, he offered an overall total of 35 per cent of the assets.

The wife sought 50 per cent of the total assets. During the marriage she had hoped that he would agree to vary the agreement, but the court found it was never varied. Was she entitled to “share” in the assets, despite having given up her entitlement to do so? Otherwise was she entitled, at the very least, to have her needs met and to be compensated for having given up her job and having children?

Or was the case to be dealt with by reference to French law only, which would have applied had the parties been living in France?

The judgment

Mr Justice Moor rejected the argument about the application of French law. In England, English law is always applied. He then considered the state of the relevant law in England.

The judge referred of course to Radmacher, focusing on the Supreme Court’s comments about the various elements of any financial award: needs, compensation and sharing.

With regard to sharing, he pointed out that even though Lady Hale dissented in Radmacher, she still commented as follows:

In the present state of the law, there can be no hard and fast rules save to say that it may be fairer to accept the modification of the sharing principle, than of the needs and compensation principles.

It seems to me that this is what Mr Justice Moor did. He upheld the agreement and rejected the compensation argument. He then made provision for the wife’s needs, which he accepted could not be fully met out of her own capital. He awarded a lump sum for a house and capitalised her income requirements per Duxbury.

He assessed the wife’s income needs at £100,000 per annum. For most of us this is a small tax-free fortune each year, but surely not for a wife in these circumstances, with such a high-earning husband and a substantial lifestyle? The judge did, however, add £75,000 per annum for the three children.

When totted up, the total she received amounted to 40 per cent of the assets. What a neat sum – so neat, in fact, that I wondered if it had been in the judge’s mind and if he had worked back from there!

Final thoughts

I have put off writing about this judgment because I wanted to consider its overall effect. I think it is full of common sense. Mr Justice Moor made it clear that if there had not been a prenuptial agreement, the wife would have received 50 per cent of the assets. But because there was an agreement, and because the judge gave effect to that agreement, he was left with no alternative but to make sure that the wife’s needs were met.

What is wrong with that?

After 14 years of marriage, three children and vastly changed circumstances, it seems to me that the decision in this case was spot on.

What comes next year may change everything again but, in the meantime, I can see nothing wrong with the law as set out in Radmacher v Granatino, and applied in Z v Z. I said it when the Radmacher judgment was handed down and I’ll say it again: there is no need for any further legislation. The judiciary are doing a fine job of applying the law.

In the recent High Court case of FG v MBW ([2011] EWHC 1729 (Fam) child maintenance payments were ordered to be made out of a non-resident father’s capital.

So does this then set a precedent for similar orders where an absent parent fails to pay a fair level of child maintenance from his or her income? Or is the ruling highly specific to the details of this case?

The circumstances of this case are particularly complex and worth considering in some detail.

Top-up maintenance

The relationship between mother and father had lasted 4 years and they had a child in 2002, named Luc, but remained unmarried. They separated shortly after Luc’s birth and the father then had a further son after marrying and then later divorcing. At the time of this judgment he resided with a new partner and had fathered a third child.

He made maintenance payments to Luc in accordance with an order made under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989. Maintenance payments had not been subject to a Child Support Agency (CSA) assessment because the father earned in excess of the £2,000 per week maximum level of CSA assessable income.  Therefore the case concerned a higher“top-up” maintenance payment, based on the lifestyle the mother had enjoyed during their relationship and their future expectations for Luc as they had been at that time.

Under an order made in 2005, the father paid £1,886 in child maintenance each month. This was based upon the couple’s salaries, which amounted to £130,000 per year in total. They had a comfortable lifestyle and were paying for Luc to be privately educated.

During the father’s divorce proceedings, Luc’s mother learnt that shares in one of the companies he had owned appeared to still belong to him, whereasduring the 2005 maintenance proceedings he had alleged these were in his wife’s name.

The mother obtained disclosure of the husband’s financial position as he had been presenting it during divorce proceedings.   It was shown that he hadclaimed that the shares belonged to him and had been put into his wife’s name to “ensure they were protected from a litigious ex-girlfriend”.

Giving evidence during the 2011 proceedings, the father claimed that he had only made that statement because he wanted the shares to be included in the pot of family assets for the purposes of the divorce.

The father’s earnings had also increased consistently over the years since the original maintenance order, which had been based on a projected future salary of £150,000. In addition, it was thought that he could expect significant capital growth in the future. He failed to disclose these facts to the mother and, although he had made some small voluntary increases in child maintenance, these were not proportional to his increase in income and capital.

The mother had been unemployed for some time after sustaining injuries in a car accident. She was in receipt of state benefits and her long-term prognosis and capacity to work were uncertain.

A decision born of uncertainty

There are two distinct features of this case:

• It is a “top-up” case in which maintenance is to be higher than the level at which the CSA administrates;
• Non-disclosure was alleged by the mother and the application was for an upward variation of maintenance payments. It was not a case of non-payment, but of under payment.

It is only in top-up cases,or where an agreement has been reached between the parents as to child maintenance arrangements,that the court has the jurisdiction to make a maintenance order under Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989.  However where an agreement is reached, a party may apply to the CSA for an assessment after 12 months have passed.  This may result in the sum of the original child maintenance agreement, which may have been relatively generous, being reduced and maintenance arrangements falling outside of the jurisdiction of the court.

It may be possible for a “Christmas” order to be agreed between parties,which would have the effect of ensuring that the maintenance agreement was never more than 12 months old and therefore could not be subject to CSA assessment.

It is likely that where relations between parties are acrimonious, no agreement will be reached. Where there is no substantial wealth on the part of the absent parent and no agreement, the CSA will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. Unfortunately this excludes the vast majority of cases from the court’s jurisdiction.

In delivering his judgment in this case Mr Justice Charles found that there had been inconsistences in the father’s account of his ownership of the company shares.  The father’s financial position was described as being “in a state of transition” and his future income therefore uncertain.  His current disclosed income indicated that he would have to meet maintenance payments by using his capital reserves.

So why were payments ordered out of the father’s available capital of £130,000? This was largely due to the uncertainty of the financial positions of both parties and the fact that there would only be clarity as to their positions in the long-term. In the meantime, even though an increased maintenance order would mean the father eating into his capital, this was considered preferable to reducingpayments to Luc: the interests of the child were paramount.   In this instance the issue of maintenance will be subject to future review in light of any future capital gains or increase in income.

Balance of fairness

I believe that the most crucial point to emerge from this judgment is the alteration of the balance of fairness between the parents. The balance had previously been tipped in favour of the father, insofar as he was able to conceal income and assets and the onus was on the mother to uncover any facts that would entitle her to a higher level of maintenance for their son.

As a result of this decision, the balance of fairness seems to have been equalised, as in order for the father to make any application for a reduction in maintenance payments he must provide financial details showing that he cannot afford the current payments  He therefore must disclose information for his own benefit.

The advantage gained by the mother is that she is at the very least able to maintain the higher level of payment awarded in the case. Combined with the order made by the judge for further, regular disclosure in the future by the husband, her son is in a much more certain and strong position as to his future financial wellbeing.

But is this an example of maintenance payment enforcement in the long-term, or an example of a short-term arrangement designed to secure payment just for the time being?

It is clearly not intended that the father carry on making payments out of his capital. However, now that the balance of fairness has been adjusted between the parties the likelihood of being able to enforce maintenance at an appropriate level in the future does seem to be stronger.

The court expecting an absent parent to pay maintenance from capital reserves could be a crucial development. But the circumstances of this case are very particular. It will prove difficult to extend this principle to CSA-assessed cases where the court does not have jurisdiction.So only time will tell as to whether this ruling sets a precedent, or is merely an inventive solution to individual circumstances.

 Lindsey Randall studied at Trinity College, University of Cambridge, for an MA in English before deciding to pursue a career in law. She attended The College of Law in York before going on to study for the Bar at BPP Law School in Leeds. She is a barrister member of the Middle Temple, having been called to the Bar in 2010.Following a brief career in Banking Litigation Lindsey has decided to pursue a career in family law. She has now joined Stowe Family Law LLP .

One way to establish jurisdiction is via a form of residence in this country, but a major problem is the time frame involved. This is six months if the applicant is domiciled in this country, or twelve months if not.

Many clients are in no immediate position to assert that they have resided in this country for any recent period of time at all.

But there are two other potential avenues, assuming there ever was a connection with England, which allows you to proceed straight away and that is by asserting domicile, in one of two ways.

How to assert domicile

The first method, for European divorces that involve an applicant from an EU signatory country, is under Article 3(1) of Brussels II revised. The drawback is that both parties must be domiciled in this country. If that can be established, no prior period of residence is required.

The second, also outlined under Article 3(1) of Brussels II revised, is a “catch all” or safety net, for an applicant resident outside those EU countries. This method permits a petition to proceed “if no court of a contracting state has jurisdiction under the Council Regulation and either of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in England and Wales on the date when the proceedings are begun, the English court has jurisdiction.”

This means that in those non-EU countries, if either one of the parties is domiciled in England and Wales, it is sufficient to found jurisdiction in accordance with Section 5(2)(b) of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973.

However it is not a free-for-all. There is also a second stage. Even if jurisdiction is established, then the judge must also consider whether the applicant’s connection with England and Wales is sufficient for the court to fully exercise its jurisdiction.

The case we are going to look at later in this post is a good example, because it will help readers to consider their own position and what might be required in terms of evidence, if they wish to go down this route.

But what does “domicile” mean?

Domicile differs from nationality, or residence. Domicile is the strongest connection a person can have to his or her country, and is acquired on birth. When born, a child’s domicile of origin is the domicile of his father if his parents are married, or his mother if they are not.

In Mark v Mark (2005) UKHL 42, Baroness Hale said:

“Domicile…is a concept of the common law.

“A person must always have a domicile but can only have one domicile at a time. Hence it must be given the same meaning in whatever context it arises.”

She added:

“It governs capacity to marry or to make a will relating to moveable property; it is one of the factors governing the formal validity of a will; the domicile of the deceased also governs succession to moveable property and is the sole basis for jurisdiction under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975; legitimacy, to the extent that it is still a relevant concept, is governed by the law of the father’s domicile; domicile is one of the bases of jurisdiction, not only in matrimonial causes but also in declarations of status or parentage under the Family Law Act 1976; it is the sole basis of jurisdiction to make an ordinary adoption order under the Adoption Act 1976, s 14, or a parental order under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 30. This is not an exhaustive list but it shows the particular importance of domicile as a connecting factor in family law.”

A child’s domicile of origin remains with him unless a domicile of choice is established. This arises “when a man fixes voluntarily his sole or chief residence in a particular place with an intention of continuing to reside there for an unlimited time”, as Lord Justice Buckley outlined in IRC v Bullock [1976] 1 WLR 1178.

Domicile of choice

So, in English law you are born with a domicile of origin determined by your parents. But you can change your domicile to a domicile of choice. Sometimes people do so intentionally, for example by advising Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs that they are no longer domiciled in this country. Sometimes they do so by their actions. The taxman is wise to this. So there are a number of tests to determine if a change of domicile has really happened, before HMRC will give up on the tax.

So even though some parties may say that a domicile of origin has been changed one of choice, legally they may be found not to have done so.

The classic definition of domicile of choice is contained in the case Udny v Udny [2001] 1 FLR 921, which was decided in 1869. In that case, it was said:

“Domicile of choice is a conclusion or inference which the Law derives from the fact of a man fixing voluntarily his sole or chief residence in a particular place, with an intention of continuing to reside there for an unlimited time.

“To acquire a domicile of choice, a person must reside in a country with the fixed intention of settling there and making it his or her sole or principal home for an indefinite period. Residence simply means ‘physical presence in a country as an inhabitant of it’.

“Having acquired a domicile of choice, a person retains it until it is abandoned. Once abandoned, it is possible to acquire a new one. But if there is a hiatus, the domicile of origin revives.

“Abandonment only takes place when the person has left the country with no further intention of ever residing there again.”

If it can be established there is an intention to return to this country, for example, this may affect the decision. At Stowe Family Law we once had a case in which the parties had reserved burial plots in England for themselves, although they had moved overseas. When the wife wished to divorce it was a strong factor – if not the only one – to indicate that neither party had lost their domicile of origin.

Domicile and M v M

In the case of M v M [2010] EWHC 982, domicile of choice was considered in some detail. In this case, a wife issued a petition asserting jurisdiction because of her English domicile only. But her husband objected and the two stage process was undertaken by the court. Interestingly it was not the wife who had to prove her domicile, but her husband.

Mrs Justice Baron observed:

“The burden of proving a change of domicile lies on the party who asserts it. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. And cogent and clear evidence is required to show that the balance of probabilities has, ‘been tipped’ whether the issue is the acquisition or abandonment of a domicile of choice.”

Although the husband did not dispute that her original domicile of origin was English because her father was English, he argued that the wife had lost her domicile of origin and acquired a Danish domicile of choice.

But had she? This ultimately depends on the facts of each case which have to be considered in meticulous detail.

The family had spent four years in Denmark, which is not a signatory to the EU Council regulation. They had assets there (and none in England) and their children were of Danish nationality. Despite this, the court considered that the wife did not have the intention to remain in Demark indefinitely, and so held that that Denmark was not her domicile of choice.

The judge then went on to consider whether the court should nevertheless exercise its jurisdiction, applying the second stage of the test. Again, she pointed out that “the burden of proving that the balance of fairness requires a stay rests with the husband in this case for it is his application. It is not for him simply to show that England is not the natural or appropriate forum for the trial, but he must establish that there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than the English forum.”

Mrs Justice Baron then followed Lord Goff of Chieveley in the House of Lords case of De Dampierre v De Dampierre in 1988 when he stated

“It is, desirable to consider the meaning of the expression “the balance of fairness” No doubt there are circumstances when it can plainly be perceived that it is more fair that proceedings should proceed in foreign jurisdiction than in this country. But experience has shown that there are difficulties. First, there are factors which cannot be evenly weighed. For one class of factors may be simply relevant as connecting the dispute with a particular forum whereas another class of factors (which may embrace the former) may point to injustice arising if the dispute is remitted to that forum. It is necessary, therefore, so to structure the inquiry as to differentiate between these two classes of factor, and to decide how each should be approached in relation to the other. Second, a factor may be such that its advantage to one party may be counterbalanced by an equal disadvantage to the other and a decision has to be made how such factors should be taken into account in considering “the balance of fairness” between the parties.”

Mrs Justice Baron, on the balance of fairness test, permitted the applicant wife to proceed in England. The judge stated: “When this case commenced and I read the written material, I thought that Denmark was a distinctly possible venue, but, as the case unfolded and the oral evidence emerged, it became abundantly clear the balance of fairness including convenience between these parties made this jurisdiction the more potent destination”.

So, if you are overseas and feeling despondent, what about asserting yours or your spouse’s English domicile, and letting your spouse argue the balance of fairness test against you… in England?

Postscript.

Professor Rebecca Bailey Harris has today given the firm a talk entitled “The New EU Maintenance Regulation” ( Council Regulation (EC)no4/2009) which came into force on 18th June 2011 and which deals with jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations.

In so far as it relates to jurisdiction by virtue of the sole domicile of one party, as referred to above, there may be a problem obtaining a financial settlement if it also includes a maintenance element pursuant to the brand new Article 3 (d) (and the reference to nationality should be read as domicile for England) but as it is a new provision, there is no case law on the subject. The safer option might be to apply for a capital only type settlement with no element of maintenance contained within it.

This is a highly specialist area. I am alerting readers to it, but always, please, take legal advice.

In other words: can you demonstrate a sufficiently strong connection to this country? It isn’t always easy and the answer isn’t always obvious.

Sometimes there is no connection to England at all. Sometimes there is. Sometimes there are connections to other countries, which appear to be as strong or stronger. But there is still the potential to establish jurisdiction.

Because we belong to the European Union, jurisdictional grounds are governed by European law. The relevant law is Art 3(1) of Brussels II revised, which is reproduced below:

1. In matters relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment, jurisdiction shall lie with the courts of the Member State

(a) in whose territory:

— the spouses are habitually resident, or

— the spouses were last habitually resident, insofar as one of them still resides there, or

— the respondent is habitually resident, or

— in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses is habitually resident, or

— the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least a year immediately before the application was made, or

— the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided there for at least six months immediately before the application was made and is either a national of the Member State in question or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, has his or her ‘domicile’ there;

(b) of the nationality of both spouses or, in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland, of the ‘domicile’ of both spouses.

2. For the purpose of this Regulation, ‘domicile’ shall have the same meaning as it has under the legal systems of the United Kingdom and Ireland.

If you take a look at the new petition form for divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership, you will note that Part 3 (right) is named Jurisdiction – and to a non-lawyer, I’m afraid that much of the content does seem like gobbledygook.

Here you are being asked to demonstrate why the court has jurisdiction to deal with your divorce.

Your answers in Part 3 are often of critical importance, particularly from a financial perspective. I have discussed this at length in a number of previous international family law posts; as has Frank Arndt, the head of our International Family Law department, who is dual-qualified in this country and in Germany.

You will note that the excerpt from Art 3(1) of Brussels II revised includes a reference to domicile, which is a peculiarly English/Irish concept. I have written about domicile before, and will be posting an update next. So don’t worry about what that means until next time!

In this post, I am considering the meaning of habitual residence, within the context of a divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership and also residence within the same context.

V v V and habitual residence

So how do you demonstrate habitual residence, particularly if you live a cosmopolitan life style and flit between several countries?

A recent case called V v V (2011) EWHC 1190 provides a great example. It involved a couple with connections to a number of different countries. The wife wished to proceed with a divorce in England. She claimed jurisdiction because, she said, she had been habitually resident in England, residing here for at least a year before the petition was issued. Could she proceed?

This was a hard-fought case before the parties even got to court to argue about jurisdiction. They had been many times before. As the judge said “These parties have not hesitated to litigate about every conceivable issue”. By the time the jurisdiction issue was heard (the first consideration of the court, you might think), the overall costs amounted to £925,000! Mr V and Mrs V had already litigated about interim funding, the children, contents, occupation and non-molestation orders, freezing orders and interim financial orders. The judge remarked that all these costs had been incurred “without a basis for jurisdiction being established or a page being filed in relation to the ultimate financial orders that will be required”.

Quite a fiery case, wasn’t it?

The husband was a member of a Greek shipping family. He spent considerable time in Greece, Switzerland, the USA and England. The wife had been brought up in Brazil, but had also spent considerable time in Switzerland, the USA, England and France.  The couple lived in England for three years, then left to “reset the clock” of the husband’s non domiciled tax status.

After the birth of their two children, they travelled more generally in Europe and then returned to occupy their London home. They lived there for about a year, but in 2009 the husband, anxious to avoid UK tax liability in relation to a substantial business transaction, moved to Switzerland. The wife and children continued to be based in London. In December 2009, the wife began to spend about two-thirds of her time in Switzerland, and both children were based there. Arrangements were made to sell the London home, but the wife was actively seeking rental property instead. In March 2010 she applied for a UK residence permit, which was granted a few days later, and in that month the children returned to London. Mrs V issued her divorce petition in April 2010.

The husband argued that the English court did not have jurisdiction because his wife was not habitually resident between December 2009 and March 2010.

This period of three or four months between December 2009 and March 2010 was clearly critical for both parties. The facts were minutely dissected. So was the law in which the distinction between habitual residence and mere residence was made clear.

Habitual residence is a concept under European law. Its meaning, as per the accepted interpretation of Dr Alegria Borras, is as follows: “A person’s habitual residence is the place where the person has established on a fixed basis the permanent or habitual centre of his interests, with all the relevant factors being taken into account”.

When considering a party’s “centre of interests”, the party’s intention also forms part of the court’s overall assessment – despite the argument of Tim Scott QC, who represented the husband in V v V, that “this introduces an undesirable element of uncertainty”. (Incidentally, a couple of weekends ago on that course in Bloomsbury, I discovered for myself that Tim Scott is a man of formidable brilliance. You can imagine my feelings about having to “represent” him in a role play against two lawyers on the other side, one also pretending to be the client…..!)

Z v Z and the test of intention

This test of intention, originally set out in the case of Z v Z (2009) EWHC 2626, enables a court to assess the mental element in concepts such as permanent, habitual, residence and home.

In Z v Z, Mr Justice Ryder held that the emphasis for establishing a place of habitual residence was to focus upon the centre of a family’s interests. He found that a “centre of interest” may be established quickly or slowly depending on the circumstances, and that it might not be lost in one country despite a lengthy period spent in another.

In that case, a French husband divided his time between the family home in Paris and his workplace in London. The family then relocated to London, where the children attended school. They kept a house in Paris, but within a month of relocating to London, the couple entered a trial separation. This led to divorce. The wife immediately petitioned in England and, a few weeks later, the husband issued divorce proceedings in France. The French court stayed (suspended) its process. Although the husband then found that his employers required him to return to France, the wife successfully argued that at the time she presented her petition, both husband and wife were habitually resident in England.

Mr Justice Ryder found that at the time of the family’s move to England, the couple intended to change their centre of interests and, even though the husband’s intention had since changed, he had not communicated this to his wife.

Back to V v V where, applying the objective test in Z v Z to the facts, the judge in V v V found that the wife had demonstrated the requisite intention to habitually base herself in England. It was indeed the centre of her interests. The judge conceded that in some cases, moving to another country could well amount to a change of residence.

The court will take into account the links the parties have maintained, as a family and individually, with the country of origin. It will consider where the children were educated, whether or not the children have become fully involved in their new community, and if they speak the language. The court will also consider whether the parties pay local taxes and have transferred assets to the new country.

But in V v V, even though the wife had moved and spent most of her time in Switzerland, during the period in question, she had not stopped residing in England.

The judge then turned to the distinction between habitual residence and residence. This was because Art 3 (1) requires the Petitioner to have been habitually resident at the date of presentation of the petition and to have been resident (not necessarily habitually resident) for one year prior to the issue of the petition.

There is a distinction between the two concepts, and the definition changes in different areas of the law. In children law for example, a distinction is made between habitual residence and mere temporary presence.

In V v V, Tim Scott argued that it is not possible to be resident in more than one country simultaneously – and on the face of it, he has a point. However the judge disagreed, noting: “I have no difficulty with the concept of a person being resident in more than one place at a time…a family with more than one main home, the person who spends extended periods away at an established place of work”.

He added: “Since simple residence is not a basis for jurisdiction, simultaneous residence in more than one member state cannot lead to jurisdictional conflict”.

Marinos v Marinos and the quality of residence

There is thus a clear distinction to be drawn by reference to the quality of residence, and it follows a decision in the case of Marinos v Marinos (2007) EWHC 2047. This was another case involving a Greek husband and an English wife. The wife was an air stewardess who maintained a residence with her parents in England. She became habitually resident when she undertook a planned relocation to England, issued her divorce petition the following day and thus could present her petition.

In both V v V and Marinos v Marinos, the court found that it is possible to be habitually resident in one country and resident in another. It is also possible to be resident in more than one country. Wealthy people will often maintain different homes around the globe and be resident in them. But it is not possible to be habitually resident in more than one country.

Confused? I’m trying my best to keep it simple!

If you are thinking of proceeding in England, then you must give jurisdiction some close scrutiny and thought. Do take legal advice about how these complicated rules might apply to you.

But here’s a final word of warning… Please don’t follow the example set by Mr V and Mrs V, who spent almost £1 millon on other issues before the main case even began. If you do, you may litigate away in costs the financial advantage you were trying to secure in the first place.

For example, what if parents reach a private agreement for child maintenance in the context of an overall financial settlement, which is likely better than that which the CSA would award to the receiving parent? Recently a client of mine was startled to discover that even though a generous private agreement had been proposed by the other party, it would be invalidated after 12 months if that party decided to apply to the CSA in a bid to reduce child maintenance payments.

If you have children and are going through divorce or considering it, I recommend that you acquaint yourself with the following rules:

1.            When a court order has been made before 5 April 1993: the court retains jurisdiction. The CSA will only have jurisdiction if the parent with care claims income support.

2.            When a court order has been made between 5 April 1993 and 6 April 2002: the court retains jurisdiction unless the parent with care claims income support, or the court discharges the order.

3.            When a court order has been made after 6 April 2002: the court has jurisdiction for agreements reached between the parties. Once the order has been in place for more than 12 months, however, either party can apply to the CSA after giving two months’ notice to the other party. The CSA will then take over and assess child maintenance. The parts of the court order relating to child maintenance “fall away” and will never be reinstated, even if those parts of the court order had provided for child maintenance beyond the CSA statutory provision.

4.            When there is no court order: in those circumstances, there would be no Court jurisdiction unless the parties agree or the CSA does not have jurisdiction, for example step parents. The CSA has jurisdiction.

As an example of the third and largest category, let’s take a couple who, upon divorce, settle their financial arrangements. The parent with care secures capital, pension, income or agrees to a clean break on favourable child maintenance terms (in excess of the CSA formula, perhaps, or ignoring any overnight staying contact for the purposes of deduction of child maintenance). All is well.

Twelve months later, the parent who pays child maintenance applies to the CSA to undertake an assessment. To the horror of the parent with care, the child maintenance payments are reduced. All the good intentions and the work done to achieve the global settlement are completely undone.

Can the parent with care do anything to prevent this from happening?

Any agreement that seeks to exclude a parent’s rights to apply to the CSA is void. However, as my client was delighted to discover, there is an often overlooked way for those looking to create an arrangement to minimise the impact of the CSA…

A solution in contract

The parties can “protect” themselves from the CSA if they set up payments by means of a contractual agreement. To put such an arrangement in place will usually require all of the following:

1.            A recital in the preamble of the order setting out the party’s intention

2.            Provision for child maintenance in the order itself

3.            A separate child maintenance agreement (“the contract”) setting out the obligation to pay.

The contract is designed to create a “compensatory debt”, to equal any advantage secured by either party on application to the CSA.

The contract can also be used to provide for a minimum child maintenance payment (for example if a substantial lump sum has been paid instead, or in situations where one party is concerned that the work or income of the payer is likely to be reduced or purposely depressed).

It’s flexible

With a contractual agreement, parties can reach child maintenance agreements, safe in the knowledge that they have contractual claims against their former spouse if the CSA becomes involved and assessment of maintenance falls below the original agreement.

It’s enforceable

If necessary, the same remedies are available as for breach of contract, including damages, judgment summons and potentially even bankruptcy.

In one case in which I was recently involved, we went one better. We secured provision in the order so that if the payer defaults, the final order can then be set aside in full, thereby reopening the receiving party’s matrimonial claims in their entirety.

If you are struggling with the conflicting and often contradictory jurisdictions of the court and the Child Support Agency, and you want to make provision to minimise the impact and uncertainty of the CSA, I suggest that you consider a contractual solution. It won’t work for everyone – but it may work for you.

James Thornton is a lawyer mediator at Stowe Family Law Settlements and a partner at Stowe Family Law’s Harrogate office. With 15 years’ experience, James’ specialisms include dealing with the financial issues arising from divorce, particularly when substantial personal, business or pension assets are involved. His expertise also extends to cases involving children. A former member of the Law Society’s Family Panel, James is an Accredited Specialist member of lawyers’ organisation Resolution, sits on the North and West Yorkshire Resolution committee and is a member of the West Yorkshire Family Justice Council.

1. Family Procedure Rules 2010: A Guide

2. Family Procedure Rules 2010: Mediation & the Devil in the Detail

3. Family Procedure Rules 2010: How powerful is the court?

4. Family Procedure Rules 2010: Financial Orders

However the Family Procedure Rules 2010, Practice Directions and Forms wend their way through a host of other areas. Today, before drawing this series to a close, I would like to briefly point out:

Jurisdiction & divorce

Those who practice in transnational cases are used to considering exactly how clients come within the jurisdiction of the English court, in terms of residence or domicile. They will note that in the new generic application for a matrimonial order (petition), there is no reference at all to jurisdiction.

Third parties

It is also now clear that naming a third party in a divorce should not be done unless the petitioner believes that the respondent is likely to object to the making of the divorce. Distressed clients who hold a third party responsible for the breakdown of their marriage often wish to name them. Although this has been frowned upon for a long time some courts have still insisted that if the name is known, it should be given. Now it is quite clearly intended that this should no longer happen.

Cornucopia

The new adoption rules are incorporated within the Family Procedure Rules 2010. There are rules relating to the representation of children in public and private applications; a section is devoted to violence in the home and its treatment across all the courts, all explicitly and painstakingly set out. There are rules on the implementation of the Hague Convention 1996, rules as to service, evidence, disclosure, conduct of hearings, media presence in the courts (no change). There are rules relating to enforcement of court orders here and abroad, new pension compensation sharing rules and so forth, most accompanied by practice directions.

Together these are the backbone of the family law system, all highly relevant and important, and they all pertain to the correct conduct of family law: what to do, how to do it and how best to do it. Ultimately there is no shortcut or substitute: I recommend that you read them.

Forms

Here at Stowe Family Law, one focal point of discussion has been the new forms. Our solicitors have mused upon the style and the new, all-encompassing “divorce/civil partnership/judicial separation petition”. Current petitions are different, and generally it is felt that this confers some dignity upon what is, after all, a solemn legal process. The new form was independently described to me by two solicitors as “Noddy-style”. I question whether it was necessary to dumb it down so heavily.

If the intention is to render divorce no more than a purely administrative process (as per David Norgrove’s Interim Report for the Family Justice Review, which was issued yesterday), then this is an obvious first step towards that goal.

I did smile when I read the Interim Report: if it has taken six years to develop these Family Procedure Rules, and if there are insufficient funds to update family court software, then where are all the resources required to introduce any of the Family Justice Review’s final recommendations going to come from? Cynic that I am, I suspect that many of these proposals will end up on a shelf somewhere gathering dust: another quango, and more wasted time and costs.

Final remarks.

On balance, after spending many long hours reading through the Family Procedure Rules 2010, I don’t think that the changes are too bad.

One exception, however, is the requirement for assessment as to suitability for mediation, which I believe is logistically unworkable. It is a pity that such heavy emphasis has been attributed to pre-application assessment, when involvement in mediation is by no means a guarantee of success. It can turn out to be a complete waste of time and costs, particularly in financial cases, if insufficient care is paid to obtaining good legal advice and ensuring the assets are fully disclosed and agreed. A client may turn up at his or her solicitor’s office, clutching a draft agreement – only to discover that it isn’t worth the paper it’s written on. Then they are back to square one, months down the line, with costs rising.

The Government has budgets and financial considerations for the entire country to take into account. It isn’t overly concerned with Mr and Mrs Smith, out in suburbia, getting divorced. Solicitors’ concerns, however, are for the welfare of individual clients; we want to ensure that both Mr Smith and Mrs Smith leave their marriage in full knowledge that it has been done justly – in accordance with the overriding objective.

On a positive note, bearing in mind the welfare issues involved, I’m looking forward to judges proactively exercising their case management powers in order to achieve the overriding objective. It won’t be easy. They are at the coalface, and they probably have the hardest task of all: setting the lead.

After 6 April, let’s take stock and see how the Family Procedure Rules 2010 are working in practice.

Resources

The Family Procedure Rules 2010

Practice Directions

Forms – Full List

Guidance from the Ministry of Justice

Paper on the Family Procedure Rules 2010 by John Wilson QC

Seminar notes by Lucy Reed of Pink Tape

@eGlance: the electronic toolkit and resource for money cases, published in association with the Family Law Bar Association

The Law Society’s family mediation practice note (31 March 2011)

The Family Procedure (Modification of Enactments) Order 2011

Many thanks to Karyn Fleeting and Joel Turner of Tinderbox Media, without whose technical support and assistance I could not have hoped to produce these posts.

In English divorces when there are offshore assets, often held in offshore trusts, it is common for wives to meet with resistance when they try to find out information about those assets or trusts from their husband.

One way of remedying this is by issuing Letters of Request. These are letters from an English court to the appropriate authority (usually a court) in the other jurisdiction requesting information about the assets or trusts held in that country. The letter is written by your solicitors, who then apply to the English court for its approval and to request that it is sent. The English court can, and frequently does, amend the content of the letter.

After receiving the letter the authority in that other jurisdiction can choose to do three things:

• Tell someone (for example the trustee of a trust, or the husband’s accountant) to release the documents requested
• Make someone attend court in the other country to give evidence in person
• Tell the English court to effectively “get lost”.

Bermuda goes one way…

Over the last few years, Bermuda has acquired a reputation for being “trust friendly” by – amongst other things – rejecting letters of request out of hand.

The most famous example of this was in the case of Charman V Charman in 2005. The divorce’s financial settlement hung on a dispute over an offshore trust the husband had set-up in Bermuda.

The English High Court, and then the English Court of Appeal (after an unsuccessful appeal by the husband) issued letters of request to the Bermudian authorities, only to find that the Bermudian judge refused to order the trustees of Mr Charman’s massive trust (thought to be worth £67 million) to disclose any information.

When they heard that the Bermudian judge was refusing to budge the English courts described his behaviour as “somewhat churlish” and the decision as “rather parochial”.

However, the Bermudian courts, perhaps stung by this criticism, seem to have changed their view.  In the case of Sarah Felicity Jennings v Robert Albert Jennings, decided in December 2009, the Supreme Court of Bermuda decided that it had previously been wrong to refuse the English Court’s letters of request during the Charman V Charman proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that the English Court of Appeal’s decision represented the correct law to be applied by the Bermudian courts when dealing with Letters of Request from English courts.

…And Jersey goes the other way

Historically, Jersey has been much more cooperative than other offshore jurisdictions when dealing with Letters of Request from English courts.

In the 2005 case of Minwalla v Minwalla [1 FLR 771] the Jersey Royal Court compelled the trustees of a large family trust to produce  information requested following a High Court decision in England.

The pendulum now seems to have swung the other way. In the Jersey Royal Court case of Deery v Continental Trust Company Limited and Peter Lawrence Watts, which was decided in January 2010, the Jersey Royal Court refused to grant the English court’s Letter of Request. The request was refused because the letter asked for disclosure of affidavits sworn by the trustees in separate Jersey court proceedings (brought by the trustees to ask for guidance in running the Trust).

The Jersey Royal Court said that if trustees thought such documents could be disclosed in different proceedings within another country, to someone who was hostile to the trust, they would no longer be “full and frank” in their disclosure to the Jersey Royal Court when taking part in proceedings about the running of the trust.

Constantly changing

The two recent decisions give an interesting insight into the constantly changing relationship between English courts and those of offshore jurisdictions.  The shifting dynamics provide a constant challenge to advisors when telling wealthy clients where it will be safest to set up an offshore trust.

They also go to show that you should never take a foreign court’s level of cooperation (or indeed non-cooperation) for granted.

Stowe Family Law is the UK’s largest specialist family law firm, with offices and divorce solicitors in London, Yorkshire and Cheshire.

With an outstanding national and international reputation, the firm provides a full range of private client family law services. Our divorce solicitors are praised by clients, the media and legal guides for their knowledge and expertise.

Marilyn Stowe and members of the Stowe Family Law team

Letter box image credit: Mike_Fleming.

Within the European Union, transnational family law does not operate as smoothly as one might reasonably expect, despite the determination to create a genuine area of freedom, security and justice whereby decisions taken in one member state are recognised and enforced throughout the EU.  Member states operate different divorce laws for its citizens, which may vary dramatically in other member countries. When litigants in member states look – understandably – for the smoothest way out of their domestic tangles, they can come a cropper.

It was a stylish and memorable evening (pictured above: with CBBC partner Alexandre Boiche and others). When I arrived at CBBC there were more than 100 people drinking champagne and attacking the buffet. The firm is located in the heart of Paris on Boulevard de Sébastapol, across three floors in a beautiful building just across from the courts on the Île de la Cité, next to Notre Dame Cathedral. I plunged straight in with my terrible French, which fortunately didn’t last too long, because most people took pity on me and spoke English!

I chatted to German lawyers from Stuttgart and Saarbrucken. I had a conversation with a French professor of law about French divorce law; there were diplomats present with an interest in child abduction cases.

Talking, it became clear that we continue to be divided and exercised by the laws that appear, vanish or change whenever a border is crossed. For example, Paris isn’t London. We don’t have a Civil Code; we have statute law and conventions of judge-made law.  La Manche divides us geographically (even if there is a tunnel underneath) but there is an economic, cultural and social divide that is reflected in our different law, practice and procedure.

Now that citizens of EU member states can travel freely, live in the EU country of their choice and trade anywhere within the EU, the legal challenges are being highlighted with increasing frequency. Thousands of nationals from different member states, who have decided to move elsewhere, have later found themselves caught up in family breakdowns in alien jurisdictions and cultures. I have described these challenges, along with some of the advice that we offer Stowe Family Law’s expat clients, in a previous post about international divorce.

There are ongoing attempts to make life easier for litigants across Europe: the recognition of foreign divorce decrees and foreign judgments, the enforcement of foreign judgments (in relation to maintenance and particularly in family law, dealing with children who are moved by their parents from country to country within the EU).

Even so, family law matters remain subject to unanimous agreement by every member State. Any plan to remove the national veto in relation to family law must be approved by our Parliament and every other national parliament in the EU. To obtain consensus across the board is a logistical nightmare. The surface is being scratched but the wheels grind very slowly, despite the best intentions.

To get some idea of the size and scale of the problems that are increasingly being faced, take a look at the website of the European Judicial Network, paying particular attention to civil and commercial matters

The website provides fascinating reading, setting out details for all its member states, community law and international law to boot. But don’t you get the impression that whatever they may say, however many conferences, committees, programmes, meetings, discussions, and resulting papers are produced, it isn’t working as well as it might?

Will it ever be possible for EU citizens, who can travel so freely, to no longer need to go forum shopping to take advantage of the “best” jurisdiction? For EU citizens to no longer fear moving to a different member state with “unsuitable” domestic law?

If you are planning to move to another country, think ahead. Consider signing a postnuptial agreement before you go, for example, so that if the worst does happen you do not find yourself stuck.

The will to succeed is there. I noted that in Paris, although the attendees had come from different countries and spoke different languages, our aims, concerns and enthusiasm for the practice of family law in Europe were shared.

However the challenges loom large, appear to be insurmountable and are soaked in European politics. In truth I will be surprised to see real harmonisation in family law, particularly in relation to matrimonial property. For the foreseeable future and beyond, I fear that we are limited to what we have now.

“Plus ca change – plus c’est la meme chose.”

The city is buzzing: in a few days’ time Oprah will close the famous Michigan Avenue – the “Magnificent Mile” of top stores – and launch her next series from outside the Wrigley Building. The Black Eyed Peas will be in concert with her!  Next month, Chicago will learn if it has succeeded in its bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games.

I am fond of Chicago and find it difficult to do it justice when describing it. Situated on Lake Michigan, its architecture is stunning. The buildings are set off by the vast lake and the river that flows through the city. The views are overwhelming.

As for the artwork in this city: it is spellbinding. Want to see that quintessential American painting, American Gothic? It is here. So too is the best collection of French Impressionists in the world, displayed in room after room at the Art Institute of Chicago.

I took a trolleybus down to Chicago’s South Side, to visit the areas where blues music has a home and to see the relatively modest home where a black American law lecturer and his family lived – before he became President of the USA and left for the White House.

Schiller DuCanto & Fleck is situated on the top floor of a skyscraper on LaSalle Street, which doubles as Gotham City in the Batman films, and its offices provide amazing views across the city. The firm is headed by renowned American “superlawyer” Donald Schiller.

I didn’t know what to expect when I visited, but I needn’t have been concerned. The lawyers there, all of whom have excellent credentials, could not have been friendlier.  Our lively session, during which English and American divorce law was compared and contrasted, gave food for thought on both sides.

My topic was Divorce: Discretion v Certainty – a Peculiarly English Approach. Stowe Family Law trainee solicitor Liz Bell, who has been involved in some of our bigger money cases, assisted me with the Powerpoint presentation, as did Andrea Essen of our Children’s Department. The presentation was a whirlwind tour of English divorce law and procedure. I wanted to explain our ethos and approach; I also wanted to examine our law in the context of current procedure.

It was very interesting to note the US reaction to the non-confrontional , non-aggressive ethos that is preferred by our English courts. Examples of this ethos include the lack of conduct issues and the dearth of arguments about the rights and wrongs of parties’ behaviour to one other.  My impression was that here in the USA, conduct counts markedly – one way or the other!

I was asked about remarriage prospects and confirmed that in England and Wales, potential remarriage prospects do not influence a financial settlement. Again, this is different in the USA.

I discussed court procedure in England and Wales, in particular the financial dispute resolution (FDR) hearing, which enables the vast majority of cases to settle without the need for a full hearing. I believe that FDRs work well because they give judges valuable opportunities to be frank and helpful, avoiding further confrontation and saving costs. I also explained, in relation to the meeting of financial needs, how injustice may be overcome by the exercise of judicial discretion afforded by section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

Prenuptial agreements were also touched upon. I was asked about the approach that a US lawyer should take, if a client had ended up living in England. I discussed the Radmacher v Granatino case and the principle of comity with other countries. My advice? Our courts clearly wish to act in sync with courts around the world. So if a prenup involves citizens from other countries, who have been properly advised by their lawyers, why not? Their own courts would uphold the agreements.

My visit was an immensely interesting experience. During an enjoyable tour of the offices I was shown the coveted corner offices belonging to the senior partners, the private salon for celebrity clients and the ‘war room’ where prep for cases takes place!

I was also proud, as an English lawyer, to reinforce what I believe to be the just and relatively low key values and standards of our legal practice and procedure. Don’t get me wrong: English lawyers know how to stand their ground, but they appear to be less openly aggressive than their US counterparts.

You cannot easily judge, define or gain a comprehensive understanding of another legal system. However you can certainly get a flavour and an approach. I do like the in-house style of US lawyers: some are trial lawyers and some aren’t, but cases don’t have to be shipped out to barristers. It is a sensitive topic with pros and cons, but it was interesting to hear that trial lawyers still need to be fully briefed by their colleagues, even in the same firm.

I suppose that I will soon be back to reality – coping with horrible jet lag, no doubt. Chicago will become a memory; but what a memory! It has been an honour and a privilege to spend time in this city.

When I explored the facts before me, however, I was soon engulfed in the CSA’s labyrinthine complexities.

According to the CSA’s Quarterly Statistics, more than 6,200 non-resident parents are living abroad but only a quarter of these are paying child maintenance through the CSA. The CSA is unable to enforce maintenance abroad, but this does not mean that the assessed maintenance is written off. Instead, a debt accrues at the CSA in each case. No wonder the CSA has a resource problem – combined, these debts could be in the millions!

Legislation introduced in 1991 meant that on the face of it, a move abroad and habitual residence there was the ideal way for a non-resident parent to evade financial responsibility for a child. This changed in 2000, when the rules were amended to allow for certain circumstances when the CSA would still have jurisdiction to enforce maintenance. These circumstances include:

• When the non-resident parent works for a UK based company abroad.
• When the non-resident parent is a civil servant or works within Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service or Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service.
• When the non-resident parent is a member of the armed forces.
• When the non-resident parent works abroad on a secondment for a prescribed body such as a NHS trust or a local authority.

Additionally, the vagueness of the term “habitual residence” can give rise to grey areas. The CSA does not define habitual residence; nor is there any case law that deals with this definition in the context of the CSA.

In general terms, “habitual residence” would suggest that you are resident in the country in which you are living. However if the non-resident parent’s sole motivation for a move abroad is work commitments, and they intend to come back to the UK, then the CSA could view their habitual residence as being in the UK. This is especially true if there is already a home and family in the UK, or if the parent spends more than 92 days a year in the UK and is registered as resident for tax purposes.

So when doubt hangs over a parent’s “habitual residence”, that parent may face a bill for ongoing maintenance and arrears accrued during time spent abroad. If this bill is left unpaid, it can be enforced by the CSA through the courts, using a Deduction of Earnings Order. This would mean that the CSA could take a sum out of the parent’s earnings each month, at source. Alternatively the non-resident parent could contact the CSA and try to come to some agreement over how much they can pay and when.

There are other processes whereby maintenance can be enforced upon a parent living abroad. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders (REMO) allows orders made for maintenance in a UK court on behalf of a UK resident to be enforced by either the courts or authorities of the foreign country in which the non-resident parent is living. A list of countries that are party to this process can be found on the CSA website.

In order to begin this process, the parent with care of the children should either apply to the magistrates’ court to register an already existing order abroad, or apply to the magistrates’ court to make an order for maintenance to be registered abroad. The order then effectively becomes an order of that foreign country and is, therefore, governed by the law of that country.

If arrears of maintenance accrue through the courts and are backdated by more than 12 months you must obtain leave of the court before you are able to reclaim these.  By contrast the CSA has no cut off date for arrears and are entitled to enforce arrears which are more than 12 months old. A CSA assessment will not accrue arrears if it is suspended by the parties, but will otherwise continue to accumulate.

Ultimately, it should be remembered that child maintenance is money that is owed to the child, not the other parent. Child maintenance is the responsibility of the non-resident parent and therefore it should be paid.

If the non-resident parent believes that their assessment is wrong or they cannot afford to pay then there may be some virtue in asking for a review or an appeal of their assessment. However this must be done within one month of receipt of the letter detailing the assessed amount that they are liable to pay.

So it seems that non-resident parents who think moving abroad will help them elude the CSA may have to think again. Parents who move abroad for legitimate reasons also need to consider whether they remain subject to the CSA’s assessments – and prepare accordingly.

Rachel Baul joined Stowe Family Law in 2004, and is a member of the Law Society’s Family Law Panel. She specialises in all areas of family law and ancillary relief, and has been commended by a number of the firm’s high profile clients.

Note: This blog receives lots of queries related to the Child Support Agency (CSA). Unfortunately, because of the complex and labyrinthine nature of CSA processes and rules, such questions often call for lengthy and long-winded answers. For this reason, it is difficult to answer such queries on an individual basis.

If you are seeking advice about a situation that involves the CSA, perhaps these earlier posts will help. If your CSA-related query is of a pressing nature, I recommend that you contact the National Association for Child Support Action: a hardworking organisation that can provide ongoing assistance, advice and support.

Child and sea image credit: Pingu1963.